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Abstract
This  paper  examines the direction and qualities  of  the extensive Criminal 
Justice  Sector  (CJS)  reforms  to  policing,  prisons  and  probation  under  the 
Coalition Government of  2010-2015.  First,  we examine the ways  in  which 
austerity and the ‘crime drop’ informed the Coalition’s overarching approach 
to CJS reform. Second, we examine in detail the content of policing, prisons 
and probation policies under the Coalition. Third, we move to explore the key 
themes emergent in the Coalition’s approach to CJS reform and discern a set 
of continuities with the preceding New Labour administration, as well as  a 
set of contradictions embedded in the qualities of the reforms. In other words, 
the  question  remains  as  to  the  relative  influence  of  evidence,  localism 
(democracy)  and  ideology  as  drivers  of  CJS  policies  set  against  the 
backdrop of continued austerity.
Introduction
The Criminal Justice System (CJS) in England and Wales went through 
extensive reform under the Coalition Government of 2010-2015. In this 
paper, and through the lens of policing, prisons and probation, we set 
out to identify the direction and qualities of these reforms. The focus 
on  policing,  prisons  and  probation  is  justified  on  the  basis  that 
interrogation  of  these  major  aspects  of  the  CJS  should  enable  the 
principles  underpinning  the  Coalition’s  approach  to  the  CJS  to  be 
discerned. The paper is structured in the following fashion. First, and 
recognizing that context serves to shape policy, we examine the ways 
in  which  austerity  and  the  ‘crime  drop’  informed  the  Coalition’s 
approach to the CJS. Second, we progress to examine the content of 
policing, prisons and probation policies under the Coalition. Third, we 
move to identify the key themes emergent in the Coalition’s approach 
to the CJS. Finally, we offer some brief conclusions.
1. Context 
Context  conditions the nature of  policy  development.  Whilst 
policy-making  is  an  inherently  political  process  (Davies  and 
Nutley,  2001),  driven  by  ideology,  it  is  also  shaped  by  the 
context  in  which  it  is  designed  and  delivered.  Two  factors 
stand out as framing CJS policy design and delivery under the 
Coalition between 2010 and 2015, these being: austerity; and, 
the ‘crime drop’. 
The Coalition Government came to power as the extent of the global 
financial  crisis  came  to  be  realised.  Its  response  to  this  crisis  has 
become known as the ‘austerity agenda’, or ‘deficit reduction plan’ as 
articulated  in  the  Comprehensive  Spending  Review  (HM  Treasury, 
2010).  The ‘austerity  agenda’  clearly  underpinned all  public  service 
thinking between 2010 and 2015, though resource pressures pre-date 
– and will  presumably outlive – austerity.  Garside and Ford (2015a), 
drawing on data from Her Majesty’s Treasury report, identified an 18 
per cent reduction in CJS expenditure between 2010 and 2015. In other 
words, by 2015, the Home Office and Ministry of Justice spent over £4 
billion less than they did in 2010.
In terms of police service funding, reductions in excess of 20 per cent 
were  sought  between  2011  and  2015;  over  that  period,  forces 
identified over £2.5 billion of savings (HMIC, 2014). A key means by 
which  these savings were  achieved was through a  reduction  in  the 
number of police officers (and staff). The number of police officers in 
England  and  Wales  had  risen  during  the  first  decade  of  the  21st 
century, reaching a historic peak of 144, 274 in 2009. However, and by 
the  end  of  2014,  this  number  had  fallen  by  approximately  16,000 
(ibid.), or 11 per cent. 
Similarly, and between 2010 and 2014, the Ministry of Justice reported 
that it had reduced its net annual expenditure by approximately 27 per 
cent  (Ministry  of  Justice,  2014a).  In  this  period,  the  budget  for  the 
National  Offender  Management  Service  fell  by  approximately  £600 
million (ibid.). Between 2010 and 2013, the number of prison officers 
(and staff)  in England and Wales declined from 49,348 to 39,295, a 
reduction of 20.4 per cent, whilst the number of probation officers fell 
from 19,067 to 16,236, a reduction of 14.8 per cent (Garside and Ford, 
2015b).
Set alongside the ‘Austerity agenda’, it is important to recognise that 
the Coalition Government came to power in era in which the overall 
level of crime (and to an extent public worry about crime), in England 
and Wales as in other polities, was on a downward trajectory (ONS, 
2014a;  Tseloni  et  al.,  2010).  Indeed,  it  continued  to  fall  under  the 
Coalition Government. Police recorded crime and the Crime Survey for 
England and Wales (CSEW) evidence a decline in the overall level of 
crime under the Coalition Government of approximately 10 per cent. 
This led Crime Prevention Minister Norman Baker (2014) to state that 
‘England and Wales are safer than they have been for decades’. That 
said, there are still an estimated 7.3 million incidents of crime and the 
rate  of  decline  shows  evidence  of  slowing  (ONS,  2014a).  Whether 
falling police officer numbers (and staff) are responsible for the slowing 
of the ‘crime drop’ is uncertain, as the evidence base linking police 
numbers  to  crime  rates  is  equivocal.  Moreover,  whilst  the  level  of 
traditional or community-centred forms of crime have fallen, new forms 
of  criminal  activity  such  as  cyber  crime,  fraud,  terrorism,  and  the 
trafficking  of  people  and  goods  have  emerged  (Independent  Police 
Commission, 2013), the scale of which is difficult to quantify. 
At this juncture, it is pertinent to identify some factors that have failed 
to evidence positive or sustained change in line with the ‘crime drop’ 
and which, therefore, represent important contextual challenges to the 
design and delivery of Coalition CJS policy. First, the public is seemingly 
ignorant  of  the  ‘crime  drop’,  though  this  is  nothing  new.  At  the 
commencement  of  the  New Labour  administration  (1997-2010),  the 
disjuncture between the ‘crime drop’, public concern about crime and 
disorder, as well as falling (though relatively high) confidence in the 
police,  became  known  as  the  ‘reassurance  gap’  (Millie,  2014).  In 
response,  a  national  programme  of  reassurance  policing  was 
developed by New Labour with the clear intention to address public 
perceptions  of  crime  and  confidence  in  the  police,  as  much  as  to 
achieve further reductions in crime. The central mechanisms through 
which  these  aims  were  to  be  achieved  were  greater  community 
engagement  and  policing  visibility  (Tuffin  et  al.,  2006).  A  key 
contextual challenge for the Coalition, therefore, was how to achieve 
increased public confidence in the police in the face of declining police 
numbers.  Recent  data  from  the  CSEW  indicates  that  whilst  public 
confidence in the police remains high, its upward trajectory (achieved 
under New Labour) was not maintained throughout the duration of the 
Coalition Government. Whether this was the result of decreased police 
numbers is uncertain, though the public report decreased likelihood in 
seeing a foot patrol officer (ONS, 2014b). 
Second, and despite the ‘crime drop’, prison numbers in England and 
Wales almost doubled between 1993 and 2012 from 41,800 prisoners 
to  over  86,000  (Ministry  of  Justice,  2013a).  Prison  numbers  were 
broadly  stable  during  the  period  of  the  Coalition  government,  one 
notable exception being in the aftermath of the public disorder of 6-9 
August 2011 that led to an immediate increase of around 900 in prison 
(ibid.). There is no direct link between crime rates and prison numbers 
in the UK. The Ministry of Justice (ibid.) report that two factors caused 
the increase in the prison population of England and Wales between 
1993 and 2012: tougher sentencing and enforcement outcomes; and, a 
more serious mix of offence groups coming before the  courts.  Early in 
the Coalition government period there was little evidence of changing 
attitudes to sentencing. Based on CSEW data from 2010/11 , Hough et 
al. (2013) found that attitudes to sentencing had changed little since 
1996, with most people thinking that the courts were too lenient but 
underestimating  the  severity  of  sentencing  practice  and  expressing 
relatively  lenient  sentencing  preferences  when  presented  with  a 
hypothetical case. At the time of writing more recent evidence was not 
available.
Finally, rates of re-offending under the jurisdiction of the CJS in England 
and Wales are relatively high and have remained so for many years. 
Indeed, the proven re-offending rate for adults cautioned, convicted or 
released from custody has remained at around 25 per cent for the last 
10 years (Ministry of Justice, 2015). For those released from custody 
the  proven  re-offending  rate  is  higher,  though  also  stable,  being 
between 45 and 50 per cent over the last ten years (ibid.).
In  summary,  the  ‘austerity  agenda’  has  loomed  large  over  the 
Coalition’s  approach to  the CJS,  as  it  has  across  all  areas of  public 
policy. In short, the CJS has been required to operate in the context of a 
significantly  reduced  expenditure  profile.  The  most  obvious 
consequence of this, which in turn has (surely) framed the potential 
content of CJS policies, has been a reduction in CJS staffing. This trend 
holds true for policing, prisons and probation. Alongside the ‘austerity 
agenda’, CJS policy has been designed and delivered in relation to an 
apparent longstanding ‘crime drop’ or rather, as we have argued, in 
relation to that which has not changed in line with the ‘crime drop’. 
Thus, a set of seemingly intractable factors have served to frame the 
design and delivery of the Coalition’s CJS policy, these being: concern 
over  the  level  of  public  confidence  in  policing;  the  high  level  of 
imprisonment; and, the high level of the proven rate of re-offending. In 
this section,  we have noted that the qualities of  these factors have 
(seemingly)  changed  little  between  2010  and  2015.  However,  it  is 
important  to  recognise,  given  the  time  lags  associated  with  policy 
implementation, that the effects of the Coalition’s policies governing 
the police, prison and probation sectors are yet to take full hold. 
2. Policing, prisons and probation policy under the 
Coalition 
In this section, we survey the key developments in CJS policy in the 
police, prison and probation sectors between 2010 and 2015.
Policing
The  key  elements  of  the  Coalition  plan  to  reform  policing  were 
presented  in  a  White  Paper  entitled,  ‘Policing  in  the  21st  Century’ 
(Home Office,  2010),  elements  of  which  became part  of  the  Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011). In the Ministerial foreword 
to the White Paper, Teresa May stated that, ‘we need to once again 
reform policing  in  the  country;  restoring  once  more  the  connection 
between the  police  and  the  people,  putting  the  public  back  in  the 
driving seat and enabling the police to meet the new crime and anti-
social behaviour challenges’ (ibid.:  3).  The Coalition thus placed the 
need to enhance police-public relations at the heart of their plans to 
reform policing. The principle mechanism of this ‘reconnect’ was the 
replacement of police authorities with directly elected Police and Crime 
Commissioners (PCCs), who hold the responsibility for creating police 
and crime plans, commissioning victim and community safety services, 
and both the appointment and dismissal of Chief Constables. Though 
there was widespread recognition that the governance of policing was 
in  need  of  reform,  in  particular  because  the  inability  of  police 
authorities to ensure that local concerns were adequately addressed by 
their  police  forces,  replacing  an  authority  with  an  individual  with 
significant  power  poses  the  potential  to  politicize  the  police,  with 
elected politicians not chief constables setting the strategic direction of 
police forces (Joyce, 2011). To date, however, there is limited evidence 
to  suggest  that  the  establishment  of  PCCs  has  served  to  foster 
enhanced  police-public  relations.  Indeed,  the  Independent  Police 
Commission (2013) regard PCCs as an ‘experiment that is failing’ and 
that  it  is  ‘difficult  to  envisage  how  a  single  individual  can  provide 
effective democratic governance of police forces covering large areas, 
diverse communities and millions of people’. 
The White Paper (Home Office, 2010) also proposed review of police 
officer pay and conditions, and of police leadership and training. Once 
again, there was in principle support for review and movement towards 
the professionalization of policing. Yet, the recommendations for police 
officer pay and conditions contained in the subsequent Winsor Report 
(Winsor, 2011), and the failure to engage the service in the programme 
of  reform, have proved highly  unpopular  and impacted upon officer 
morale.   In  a  survey  of  serving  officers,  the  Independent  Police 
Commission (2013) found that only 3 per cent felt ‘very supported’ and 
35 per cent ‘somewhat supported’ by the government. Both the White 
Paper (Home Office, 2010) and the Neyroud Report (2010) suggested 
that the Association of Chief Police Officers should take the lead on 
police leadership, national standards and best practice. However, the 
Home Secretary determined that this role would be undertaken by the 
College of Policing, which became operational in 2012 with a vision to 
create a “world-class  professional  body”  (College of  Policing,  2014). 
Taken  as  a  whole,  these  changes  irrespective  of  their  long-term 
consequence  on  recruitment,  training  and  practice  have  moved  to 
‘diminish  the  institutional  power  of  the  police’  (Garside  and  Ford, 
2015a). 
Sitting alongside these developments, the Coalition moved to establish 
a  What  Works  Centre  for  Crime Reduction  (WWCCR)  hosted by  the 
College of Policing. The objective of the WWCCR is to review research 
on  practices  and  interventions  to  reduce  crime  and  to  make  this 
evidence accessible to PCCs and the police, thus enabling the effective 
and  efficient  targeting  of  resources.  This  move  resonates  with  the 
belief of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary (HMIC, 2014) 
that  policing  in  austerity  demands  partnership  working  to  reduce 
demand on policing services and the use of evidence-based methods 
to inform policing practice. That said, and despite pockets of notable 
practice the HMIC conclude that partnership working remains largely 
underdeveloped  and  that  there  is  limited  engagement  with  the 
evidence-base,  which  itself  is  partial  in  nature  (ibid.).  This  view  is 
echoed by the baseline report of the WWCCR, which concludes that 
whilst there is clear movement by PCCs and police forces to engage in 
evidence-based  decision-making,  there  remain  significant  tensions 
between this approach and the perceived need to accommodate public 
opinion as well  as professional  insights (Hunter  et al.,  2015).  These 
tensions are unsurprising, of course, given the other elements of the 
Coalition’s policing reforms.
Prisons and probation 
The Coalition’s preferred strategy for reducing re-offending whilst also 
reducing costs was a combination of market testing, outcome focused 
commissioning strategies  and a  diversification  of  the supplier  base. 
This vision for a ‘revolution’ in offender management was described in 
the Conservative Party manifesto in the run up to the 2010 general 
election:
The principle of incentivising performance through payment by 
results,  with  success  based  on  the  absence  of  re-offending,  
should  be  introduced  for  prisons,  the  providers  of  community  
sentences  and  the  providers  of  rehabilitation  programmes  –  
whether in the public, private or voluntary sector. With devolved 
responsibilities and new incentives, we can create a revolution in  
how  offenders  are  managed,  and  drive  down  re-
offending(Conservative Party, 2009: 49).
It was subsequently enshrined in the Coalition Agreement:
We  will  introduce  a  ‘rehabilitation  revolution’  that  will  pay  
independent  providers  to  reduce  reoffending,  paid  for  by  the  
savings  this  new  approach  will  generate  within  the  criminal  
justice system (HM Government, 2010: 23).
Early  manifestations  of  this  intention  were  seen  in  plans  to  put  a 
substantial number of England and Wales’s 119 public sector prisons 
up  for  competition.  Ultimately,  two  prisons  –  Birmingham  and 
Featherstone 2 – were won by G4S, and Serco gained a new contract to 
continue  running  Doncaster  (Garside  and  Ford,  2015a).  In  2011,  a 
competition was started inviting bids to run eight public sector prisons 
and one private sector prison that had come to the end of its contract 
period1. The  result,  however,  saw  only  one  prison,  HMP 
Northumberland, passing in to the management of the private sector. 
On the other hand, the competition did identify an alternative model 
whereby  the  direct  delivery  of  core  custodial  functions  would  be 
retained by the public sector at considerably lower cost, with ancillary 
and ‘through-the-gate’ resettlement services provided through market 
competition  (Grayling 2012). Garside and Ford (2015a) argue that this 
model provides greater opportunity for the involvement of the private 
sector.
Another initiative, inherited from the New Labour administration but 
taken forward by the Coalition and fitting comfortably with the concept 
of  a  ‘rehabilitation  revolution’,  was  the  Social  Impact  Bond.  The 
Ministry of Justice signed a contract with Social Finance to attempt to 
reduce  the  reoffending  of  three  cohorts  of  1,000  adult  males  who 
would be discharged from HMP Peterborough (Disley  et al., 2011: iv). 
Investors placed £5m in social impact bonds to fund the rehabilitation 
work  and  stood  to  gain  a  potential  return  of  up  to  £8m from the 
government and the Big Lottery Fund, if re-offending amongst each of 
a thousand offenders fell by 10 per cent or if the rate of re-offending 
for  all  3,000 offenders  fell  by at  least  7.5 per cent  (Social  Finance, 
2011:  3).  Conversely,  if  offending  did  not  fall,  investors  could 
potentially lose all their money. A similar initiative, Payment by Results 
initiative was launched at HMP Doncaster in 2009. 
Measuring the outcome of Payment by Results and Social Impact Bonds 
is difficult  (Fox and Albertson 2012).  The Ministry of  Justice (2014b) 
reported on the outcome from the first cohort from both Peterborough 
and Doncaster. At Peterborough, the frequency of re-conviction events 
1 Contract notice 2011/S 206-336076 as published in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the 
European Union
was 8.4 per cent lower than a matched national control group and the 
Ministry of Justice (ibid.: 2) reported: ‘This means that the provider is  
on track to achieve the 7.5% reduction target for the final payment  
based  on  an  aggregate  of  both  cohorts,  but  that  the  pilot  did  not  
achieve the 10 per cent reduction target for cohort 1. At Doncaster the 
first cohort’s re-conviction rate was 5.7 percentage points lower than 
the 2009 baseline year. The Ministry of Justice (ibid.: 3) reported: ‘This 
is  a  successful  outcome  for  the  provider,  Serco,  because  the  5.0 
percentage  point  threshold  has  been  achieved,  and  they  therefore 
retain  the  full  core  contract  value  for  this  pilot  year’.  A  Ministry  of 
Justice (2015) statistical bulletin provides early analysis of the progress 
of the second cohorts. Although only convictions within six months of 
release, rather than the usual 12 months, are reported, the results are 
disappointing For Peterborough, there was only a small reduction in the 
frequency of reoffending – an average of 84 reconviction events per 
100 offenders compared to a national rate of 86. For Doncaster, the 
reconviction rate rose 2.8 percentage points against the previous year 
and to a level that was higher than the national comparison. Webster 
(2015) argues that: ‘These are very disappointing results for the MoJ. 
Normally, there would be an expectation of a high level of performance 
from pilots with such public exposure where the partners had chosen 
to participate and, indeed, had championed and driven the initiative 
from the outset’.
In the probation sector an early competition to let contracts to deliver 
community  payback  or  unpaid  work,  divided  into  six  regional  lots, 
resulted in only one contract, for London, being let. At the same time a 
competition for ‘innovation pilots’ was launched. One lot in the bidding 
round was designed to find innovative approaches to tackling the re-
offending of offenders who have served prison sentences of less than 
12 months, whilst the other lot was more loosely specified. The call for 
bids  stated  that  the  Ministry  of  Justice  would  ‘seek  to  develop  the 
market for payment by results through innovative forms of finance and 
strong involvement from voluntary and social enterprise organisations, 
including smaller organisations . . .’  2. A change of Secretary of State 
saw  these  innovation  pilots  discontinued  as  the  more  radical 
Transforming Rehabilitation Strategy was advanced (Ministry of Justice, 
2013b). 
Early ideas on reform of the probation service envisaged devolving the 
commissioning  of  community  offender  services  to  the  35  Probation 
Trusts.  The  aim  was  to  encourage  new  market  entrants  from  the 
voluntary, private and public sectors as well as joint ventures, social 
enterprises  and  Public  Service  Mutuals  (Ministry  of  Justice,  2012). 
Probation  Trusts  would  continue  to  deliver  services  to  high-risk 
offenders  and  could  compete  to  run  other  services.  This  devolved 
strategy seemed consistent with the earlier Green Paper on criminal 
justice reform in which the Coalition Government set out an agenda 
designed to challenge a ‘Whitehall knows best’ approach, which was 
viewed  as  having  stifled  innovation  at  national  and  local  levels 
(Ministry of Justice, 2010).
The  Transforming  Rehabilitation  Strategy (Ministry  of  Justice,2013b) 
reiterated the Ministry of Justice’s intention to introduce a widespread 
programme of competition for probation services. The Probation Trusts 
would  be  abolished  and  the  majority  of  community-based  offender 
services  (community  sentences  and  licenses)  would  be  subject  to 
competition.  Included  was  a  commitment  to  extend  license 
requirements  to  offenders  released  from sentences  of  less  than  12 
months – a group that was not previously supervised. In a reversal of 
2 Contract notice 2011/S 235-381192 as published in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the 
European Union
the  earlier  emphasis,  there  would  be  a  national  competition  for 
geographical  ‘bundles’  of  resettlement  services  in  the  form  of 
Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs). Contracts for CRCs would 
include an element of payment by results. Existing probation services 
would  be  allowed  to  join  the  competition  by  setting  up  new 
independent entities (such as employee-led mutuals). Work with high-
risk  offenders,  assessments  and court  reports  would pass  to  a  new 
National Probation Service. The split  between the National Probation 
Service and CRCs took place in June 2014 and contracts were signed 
with the successful bidders, mostly private sector providers working in 
partnership with not-for-profit organisations, to commence running of 
the  CRCs  in  Spring  2015.  The  Offender  Rehabilitation  Bill  received 
Royal Assent in March 2014 and included measures for the expansion 
of  licence  requirements  to  offenders  released  from  short  prison 
sentences and a new post-sentence supervision period. 
3. The Coalition’s approach to the CJS
In  this  section  we  set  out  some  of  the  key  themes,  and  their 
contradictions, that emerged in the Coalition Government’s approach 
to the CJS, these being: devolution and centralism; marketization with 
a  growing  emphasis  on  payment  by  results;  politicisation  and  de-
politicisation; and, evidence-based policy.
The Coalition’s approach to the CJS has been coloured by moves to 
both  devolve  and  centralise  decision-making  (Garside  and  Ford, 
2015a),  though  it  has  lacked  consistency  of  emphasis  and 
achievement. In policing, the introduction of PCCs represents a move 
to  greater  localism,  whereas  the  introduction  of  a  National  Crime 
Agency and the establishment of the College of Policing (inclusive of 
the WWCCR) are indicative of enhanced centralisation.  In the prisons 
sector, an attempt to orchestrate the devolvement of core provision 
(via  privatisation)  failed  and  was  superseded  by  the  selective 
outsourcing of estate management (ibid.). In the probation sector, the 
trajectory  to  devolve  commissioning  to  Probation  Trusts  was 
superseded by their abolition and the creation of a National Probation 
Service.  At  the  same  time,  there  has  been  a  move  to  devolve 
resettlement  services  to  CRCs  (ibid.;  Fox  and  Grimm,  2015).  In 
overview,  we  can  interpret  the  direction  of  travel  to  be  towards  a 
greater  centralisation  of  control.  CJS  policy  has,  however,  included 
elements that might be claimed to enhance the sensitivity of service 
provision  to  local  demands.  In  stating this,  it  is  also  clear  that  the 
mechanisms deployed to achieve this have been imbued by a further 
set of political imperatives (see below). Moreover, the qualities of the 
mechanisms deployed have impacted upon the outcomes achieved.
The Justice Reinvestment pilots represent an illustrative case in point. 
On the one hand, they represent a clear intention to decentralise and 
empower local delivery agencies. However, the system of metrics and 
payment  regimes  established  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice  have  been 
critiqued  as  overly  complex  and  providing  insufficient  incentive  to 
encourage local agencies to invest or to make substantial changes to 
practice that were not already being planned (Wong et al., 2013).
A second major theme of the Coalition’s approach to the CJS has been 
marketization. The use of non-public sector providers in the CJS was, of 
course,  established  prior  the  Coalition  Government.  However,  and 
between 2010 and 2015, there was clear endeavour to enlarge the role 
of markets as a key driver of reform. As Garside and Ford (2015a) note, 
there  were  variations  in  how  this  approach  to  marketization  was 
implemented both within and across sectors. Within the prison sector, 
putting individual prisons out to competition (‘vertical commissioning’) 
was superseded by a model in which whole service categories, such as 
buildings and estate management, were put out to tender (‘horizontal 
commissioning’). In the probation sector, an initial decision to devolve 
commissioning to Probation Trusts was overturned in  their  abolition. 
The  creation  of  a  National  Probation  Service  effectively  served  to 
centralise macro-level commissioning. It is worth noting that this trend 
evidences distinction from other areas of the public sector. In health 
and social  care,  for example,  there has been a clear trend towards 
decentralised place-based or even micro- level commissioning (Fox et 
al., 2013).
Another aspect of the marketization of the CJS has been the increased 
emphasis placed on payment by results (PbR), of which Social Impact 
Bonds  are  a  subset.  The  Coalition  Government  did  not  invent  PbR. 
Rather,  the  first  Social  Impact  Bond  model  was  deployed  by  the 
previous  New Labour  administration.  The Coalition  Government  did, 
however, move to implement PbR across the public sector, the largest 
being the Work Programme commissioned by the Department for Work 
and Pensions with a budget of £3.3 billion (National Audit Office, 2015). 
The  Coalition  Government  articulated  various  advantages  for  PbR 
initiatives.  First,  it  was  hoped  that  they  would  demand  less  micro-
management and so enable greater innovation. Freeing up providers to 
deliver services in different ways, the deployment of PbR would both 
drive down costs and encourage greater innovation (Ministry of Justice, 
2013b).  As part  of  its  strategy to enable PbR commissioning in  the 
probation sector, the Coalition Government (Ministry of Justice, 2011) 
revised the national probation standards, significantly relaxing central 
government direction. Later, Section 15 of the Offender Rehabilitation 
Act 2014 introduced the Rehabilitation Activity Requirement (RAR) for 
Community Orders and Suspended Sentence Orders. While the court 
decides on the length of the RAR and the number of days (intensity), 
the  Community  Rehabilitation  Company  determines  the  most 
appropriate interventions to deliver. Second, PbR was seen as a way of 
tackling complex social issues (National Audit Office, 2015), and as a 
mechanism to focus attention on preventative measures (Mulgan et al., 
2010). 
Third, PbR was seen as a means to transfer risk by making some or all 
of  the  payment  to  a  service  contingent  on  that  service  delivering 
agreed outcomes. Given the need to reduce public sector spending, 
the transference of  risk  and the deferment of  payment for  services 
were  attractive  propositions  for  the  Coalition  (Fox  and  Albertson, 
2012). Fourth, the PbR model was seen as a way of encouraging new 
market entrants, eliding with the Coalition’s commitment to increase 
the  proportion  of  specific  public  services  delivered  by  independent 
providers (both private and not-for-profit), harnessing their ‘creativity 
and expertise’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010: 41).. Finally, PbR was seen as 
a model to increase accountability. In its White Paper on  Open Public 
Services the  government  stated  that,  ‘Open  commissioning  and 
payment by results are critical to open public services ... Payment by 
results will build yet more accountability into the system – creating a 
direct financial incentive to focus on what works, but also encouraging 
providers to find better ways of  delivering services’ (Cabinet Office, 
2011:  paragraphs  5.4,  5.16.).  In  sum,  and  over  the  course  of  the 
Coalition administration, the portfolio of PbR schemes grew. However, 
a recent National Audit Office review found lack clear evidence that 
they delivered the potential benefits their supporters advocated, and 
cautioned that without such evidence, ‘commissioners may be using 
PbR  in  circumstances  to  which  it  is  ill-suited,  with  a  consequent 
negative impact on value for money’ (National Audit Office, 2015: 8). In 
these terms PbR, and marketization in general, have achieved limited 
impact upon CJS outcomes and deficit reduction. They can, however, 
be interpreted as further contributing to the redrafting of central-local 
relations,  the  direction  of  policy  travel  being  centred  whilst  the 
provision of services are devolved.
The third major theme embedded in the Coalition’s approach to the CJS 
has been its seeming move to depoliticise service reform. Here, and 
once again, there is an element of continuity with the preceding New 
Labour administration. Diamond (2013), in line with Garland’s (2001) 
thesis of the ‘hollowing out of the state’, identified the key features of 
New Labour’s approach to depoliticise public sector reform to include: 
the  systematic  use  of  audit,  recording  and  assessing  relative 
performance  in  public  services;  the  creation  of  ‘arms-length’ 
mechanisms for the management of state services, such as Foundation 
Trusts  in  the  health  sector,  Academy  schools  in  education  and 
Probation Trusts in the criminal justice sector; and, the delegation and 
‘agentification’ of public services, such as turning the Home Office’s 
Immigration  and  Nationality  Directorate  into  an  operationally 
independent  public  agency,  the  UK  Border  Agency.  Such  strategies 
place key institutions and services out with the day-to-day control of 
ministers  in  an  attempt  to  modify  the  balance  of  parliamentary 
accountability and operational responsibility. 6 and Peck (2004) do not 
find  the  depoliticised  view  of  New  Labour’s  approach  plausible  or 
convincing.  Diamond  (2013)  takes  up  this  theme  identifying 
countervailing moves to politicise public service reform, centred on the 
endeavour to demonstrate competent governance, and concluding that 
politicisation and depoliticisation strategies are dialectical in the sense 
that they are complimentary and self-reinforcing.
Aspects  of  the  Coalition’s  approach  to  CJS  reform  exhibit  similar 
tendencies. Thus, the creation of PCCs and CRCs can, on the one hand, 
be seen as a move to further depoliticise CJS reform at the national 
level.  PCCs  and  CRCs  serve  to  transfer  important  aspects  of 
accountability and service delivery beyond the day-to-day control of 
Ministers and, arguably of parliament, though there is distinct nuance 
between these initiatives. In the case of PCCs (as noted earlier), this 
shift  in  the  locus  of  accountability,  effectively  serves  to  politicize 
policing at the local level(Joyce, 2011).  In the case of CRCs, the size 
and duration of the contracts involved mean that reversing this policy 
would be extremely difficult for any future government because of the 
penalty  payments  that  would  be  incurred.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
creation of markets within the CJS can be seen as deeply ideological, 
the logical extreme of which might be the creation of tradeable assets 
and a market in Social Impact Bonds (Mulgan et al.,2010). 
A final theme that holds place in the Coalition’s approach to the CJS is 
the promotion of evidence-based policy. New Labour, at least initially, 
championed the importance of evidence-based policy (Cabinet Office, 
1999) to modern, professional policy-making (Bullock et al., 2001). For 
Bannister and Hardill (2015: 3), this marked a ‘political imperative to 
move  beyond  ideological  assertion  to  pragmatic  considerations  of 
‘evidence’  and  ‘what  works’’,  and  Diamond  (2013)  points  to  the 
emergence of ‘evidence institutions’, such as the National Institute of 
Clinical Excellence and the Monetary Policy Committee, designed to co-
ordinate the collection and analysis of evidence and data to inform the 
policy-making process.  To an extent,  this  is  a theme that continued 
under the Coalition. It established a ‘What Works Network’ of six What 
Works Centres, including the WWCCR, to collate existing evidence on 
effective  policies  and  practices,  produce  syntheses  and  systematic 
reviews of evidence where there are currently gaps and to disseminate 
this knowledge among policy-makers and practitioners. In this sense, 
the WWCCR can be seen as an endeavour to deliver efficiency savings 
through more effective practice. As indicated earlier, however, there 
are  clear  tensions  between  the  emphasis  on  evidence-based 
approaches  and  the  endeavour  to  promote  increased  sensitivity  to 
local  public  accountability  (Hunter  et  al.,  2015).  More  broadly,  the 
various reforms to the CJS described in this paper were not advanced 
upon robust evidential foundations. The Coalition did impact, however, 
upon  the  types  of  evidence  to  be  given  primacy  in  policy-making. 
Under  PbR,  service  providers  are  challenged  to  deliver  a  set  of 
specified outcomes in order to receive payment, effectively serving to 
pre-determine  the  range  of  evidence  sought  irrespective  of  it 
availability or quality (Fox and Albertson, 2012). 
4. Conclusion: Continuities and Contradictions
Reflecting  on  the  Coalition’s  approach  to  the  CJS  it  is  possible  to 
identify  a  set  of  continuities  with  the  preceding  New  Labour 
administration and a set of contradictions embedded in the emergent 
themes of  that  reform.  Austerity  and the persistence of  certain CJS 
problems  (irrespective  of  the  crime drop)  also  served to  frame the 
Coalition’s  CJS  agenda  and  the  vigour  with  which  it  was  pursued. 
Evidence of continuity, if  not emphasis, abounds. Approaches to the 
marketization of the CJS championed by the Coalition are clearly rooted 
in New Labour initiatives, though the scale of deployment has been 
markedly extended, with the marketization of probation services being 
the  clearest  example  of  this.  The  Coalition  also  acted  to  infuse  its 
approach with strategies aimed at both depoliticising and politicising 
the CJS. Again, there is clear lineage with New Labour’s approach to 
the  CJS,  though it  has  found new form as  in  the  creation  of  PCCs. 
Finally, the Coalition also moved to promote evidence-based decision-
making. Whether this will be ultimately viewed as rhetoric over reality, 
as many commentators of New Labour’s drive to evidence-based policy 
have claimed (see inter alia Maguire, 2004; Hough, 2004) is too early 
to judge.
Turning  to  consider  the  contradictions  evident  in  the  Coalition’s 
approach to the CJS, these may be viewed from two perspectives. First, 
policy development across and within the police, prison and probation 
sectors was ‘uneven’ and at times exhibited movement in contrasting 
directions. The endeavour to centralise and / or decentralise decision-
making is a clear case in point, playing out in different ways and to 
divergent timetables across each sector. Market testing and PbR, for 
example, were deployed extensively in the probation sector, but not 
within the policing sector. Another example would be the commitment 
to evidence-based policy that is most obvious in policing and offender 
interventions, but lacking in the introduction of PbR. These differences 
are partly due to the particular political sensitivities or visibility of each 
sector,  the  police  service  holding  greater  prominence  than  the 
probation  service.  That  said,  differences  between  the  ideological 
perspectives  of  key  politicians  in  the  Home  Office  and  Ministry  of 
Justice  are  also  likely  to  have  played  a  part.   Second,  policy 
unevenness is not just evident between sectors, but with sectors. Thus, 
and for example, within policing the creation of PCCs seems to be a 
decentralising  move  while  the  creation  of  a  College  of  Policing  is 
centralising. Finally, and when the legacy of the Coalition’s approach to 
the  CJS  takes  shape,  the  tensions  embedded  in  the  suite  of 
mechanisms deployed to enact policy across the CJS may come in to 
sharp relief.  In other words,  the question remains as to the relative 
influence of evidence, localism (democracy) and ideology will hold in 
the faced of continued austerity.
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